CEO Fraud: How It Works and a Payment Pause Protocol You Can Adopt This Week

Publication Date

October 26, 2026

Category

Social Engineering Tactics

Reading Time

7 Min

Author Name

Shubh Arya

CEO Fraud: How It Works and a Payment Pause Protocol You Can Adopt This Week

<pre><pre><pre><pre>CEO fraud is a scam in which criminals impersonate a chief executive or other senior leader to push an employee into sending money or sensitive data. It is a form of business email compromise, which is the other name you will see for it, although the request may now arrive by chat, phone or video as well as email.

Most guides describe the scam. This one gives you something you can use on Monday: a one-page procedure, a way to sort requests by risk, and a ten-question test of how exposed your team is today.

What the numbers say

The FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center reported business email compromise losses of just over 3 billion dollars for 2025, with an average loss per complaint above 122,000 dollars. Those are US complaints only, and they cover only what was reported. Treat the figure as a floor.

Two cases from 2024 show how the scam has changed, and how it is stopped.

Ferrari: an executive received WhatsApp messages and then a call, from someone using an AI voice that imitated the CEO's accent and talked about a supposed China-related deal needing a currency hedge. The executive grew suspicious, asked the caller for the title of a book the CEO had recently recommended, and the caller hung up.

WPP: attackers created a fake WhatsApp account with the chief executive's public photo, set up a Teams call using a voice clone and video footage of him, and asked another senior executive to help set up a new business. WPP said staff vigilance prevented it.

In both, the attempt looked real and was defeated by a human who paused. The protocol below turns that pause into a rule, so it does not depend on one person's nerve.

CEO fraud, whaling and BEC: the difference

TermWho is the target?How it works
CEO fraudAn employee, often in finance or an executive's teamThe attacker pretends to be a senior leader and issues an instruction
WhalingThe senior leaders themselvesA phishing attack aimed at executives to steal their access or credentials
BECAny employee, vendor or customerThe broad family: fake or hijacked business accounts used to redirect money or data

The Payment Pause Protocol

Print this page and put it where payments are approved.

When it applies

The protocol applies whenever a request touches any of these three triggers: money moves, access or credentials are shared, or the request asks for secrecy. It applies to everyone, including the CEO.

The four steps

StepWhat to doSay this
1. PauseStop. Do nothing for ten minutes. Real deadlines survive that."I will come back to you shortly."
2. SwitchVerify on a different channel, using a number or contact you already hold. Never use the details in the request."I will call you on your usual number to confirm."
3. Second pair of eyesA second person approves any new payee, changed bank details or payment over your agreed limit."Policy needs a second approval for this."
4. RecordWrite down who asked, how, and who confirmed. Report anything odd, even if you did not act."I am logging this and sending it to security."

Sorting requests: red, amber, green

LevelWhat it looks likeWhat happens
RedNew payee or changed bank details, a request for secrecy, a deadline of hours, a request for gift cards or crypto, or a request that bypasses normal approvalFull protocol. No exceptions. Escalate to security
AmberA known payee and normal amount, but an unusual channel such as a chat message, or a sudden change in toneSteps 1 and 2 at least. Second approver if unsure
GreenA routine, expected payment through the normal system with normal approvalsProcess as usual

Why this protocol, and not 'look for glitches'

Advice to spot a deepfake by blinking or lip movement has a short shelf life. The protocol works whatever the technology: if the impersonation were flawless, the attacker still cannot answer a call on your colleague's real number, cannot become a second approver, and cannot make ten minutes pass faster.

It also respects people's feelings. Most staff hate questioning a senior name. A rule that says 'we verify everything, including the CEO' means nobody has to be brave, and nobody has to apologise.

A question only the real person can answer, as at Ferrari, is a useful extra layer. It is weaker than the other steps because the answer must stay private and the moment of pressure makes people forget to ask. We would not rely on it alone.

The ten-question exposure test

Answer yes or no. Each no is a gap to close.

#Question
1Do we have a written rule that every payment change is verified by call-back on a number already on file?
2Does a second person approve any new payee or changed bank details?
3Does the rule apply to the CEO and the board by name?
4Do finance and executive support staff know the rule without looking it up?
5Has anyone tested the rule with a realistic scenario in the last six months?
6Is there a one-step way to report a suspicious request?
7Do we include phone and chat requests in our tests, not just email?
8Have we reviewed what is public about our executives and finance team?
9Does someone know who to call at the bank if a payment must be recalled?
10Do staff know that verifying a senior request is expected, not disrespectful?

Eight or more yes answers: a solid foundation, so test it. Five to seven: fix the gaps in the order above. Fewer than five: start with questions 1 to 3 this week, because they close the most common paths for the fraud.

If a payment has already gone

Call your bank immediately and ask for a recall. Speed matters more than anything else.

Report the incident to your security team and to the relevant law enforcement body in your country.

Preserve the messages, call logs and account details.

Tell the other people who might be targeted next. Others may be on the same target list.

SimuPhish helps teams rehearse this exact moment across email, voice and chat scenarios, and tracks whether staff report the attempt.

See SimuPhish in action

FAQs